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1. Introduction 
What is normativity? Is it socially determined or cognitively con-
strained? In this paper, we aim to provide some answers to these 
questions by considering the pathologies of both social and moral 
normativity.  
In the first part of the paper social normativity is discussed, fo-
cusing on the effects of social stereotypes on listeners’ interpreta-
tion of figurative language. Some studies have shown that adults 
with autism spectrum disorders are sensitive to stereotypes on 
genre, race and age. Is social stereotypes processing indeed intact in 
autism? Could it be resorted to for communicative purposes? Re-
cent findings suggest that individuals with high functioning autism 
have difficulties integrating stereotypical knowledge with informa-
tion about the speaker’s intention. 
In the second part of the paper, moral normativity is discussed 
in relation to the ability of identifying moral, conventional and dis-
gust transgressions. Recent results show that individuals with high 
functioning autism have difficulties providing appropriate moral 
justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions. In 
particular, they fail to use relevant information about the agent’s 
intention and the affective impact of the action outcome in con-
scious moral reasoning. 
Overall, our studies show that individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders have difficulties integrating different types of information 
in social reasoning. In particular, we argue that in both cases of so-
cial and moral normativity, individuals with high functioning autism 
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fail to integrate information coming from the socially determined 
component and from the cognitively constrained component in 
rule-following behaviour. 
2. Social normativity and stereotypes 
Social norms and conventions can be interpreted as a decisional 
shortcut that allows us to make sense of our social world and to 
predict others’ behaviour in social contexts. Human beings «possess 
a complex knowledge structure that affords interpretations of oth-
ers’ behaviour in terms of mental states such as belief and desire»1. 
This complex knowledge structure enables us to represent the social 
environment and to build some rule-following behaviour tacitly 
shared by the members of our social community.  
Contextual information is processed into social categories in or-
der to both reduce the quantity of information and extend our 
knowledge of social world by capturing similarities among their 
members. These taxonomies become social stereotypes which pro-
vide a basis for predicting the behaviour of others and interpreting 
their utterances2. Stereotypes are indeed a specific type of expec-
tancy and influence information processing by focusing attention on 
and facilitating the processing of information consistent with the 
stereotype or inhibiting the processing of inconsistent information3. 
These expectancies can be used as a guide to behaviour in social 
contexts, enabling us to anticipate how others could act in order to 
respond appropriately. 
A social stereotype is indeed a “simplified schema” or a well-
learned set of associations which works as an energy-saving strategy 
_____________ 
1 Hirshfeld L.A., Who Needs a Theory of Mind? In: Viale R., Andler D. & 
Hirshfeld L.A., (eds), Biological and Cultural Bases of Human Inference, Lon-
don: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006, pp. 131-160, p. 131. 
2 Cf. Dovidio J.F, Stereotyping. In: Wilson R. & Keil F. (eds.), The MIT Encyclo-
pedia of Cognitive Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge: MA, 2001, pp. 804-
806. 
3 Cf. Olson, J. M., Roese, N. J., & Zanna, M. P., Expectancies. In E. T. Higgins 
& A. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, New 
York: Guilford, 1996, pp. 211–238. 
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to guide our interpretation of social world. One important function 
of social schemas and related forms of knowledge structures is to 
fill in missing information about others’ personality and to help 
metarepresenting others’ intentions4. According to Hirschfeld, so-
cial stereotypes are part of the folk theory known as “Naïve Socio-
logy”, the spontaneous human mechanism for understanding of 
social groups and social relations, active from an early stage of chil-
dren development. In other words, “Naïve Sociology” is a natural 
way to make sense of5 our own intuitions about the social world 
around us. As Devine pointed out, stereotypes information process-
ing could be automatic (mostly involuntary) or controlled (mostly 
voluntary)6. Automatic processes are unintentional responses to a 
certain kind of social stimuli which activate the stereotype and can-
not be ignored. On the contrary, controlled processes are inten-
tional and require the individual’s active attention. Being more 
flexible than automatic processes, controlled processes are particu-
larly useful to begin new behaviours.  
Social impairments are part of the essential diagnostic criteria used to de-
fine autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), often related to a serious deficit of the 
capacity for mentalization7. Despite the severe social impairments, recent find-
ings have shown that adults with ASDs are sensitive to stereotypes on genre, 
race and age8, they have preserved abilities in attributing social stereotypes to 
_____________ 
4 Cf. Wyer R.S., Lee Budesheim T., Lambert A.J. & Swan S., Person Memory and 
Judgment: Pragmatic Influences on Impressions Formed in a Social Context, «Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology», 66:2, 1994, pp. 254-267; Srull T.K. 
& Wyer R.S., Person Memory and Judgment, «Psychological Review», 96:1, 
1989, pp. 58-83; Krueger J. & Rothbart M., Use of Categorical and Individuat-
ing Information in Making Inferences About Personality, «Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology», 55:2, 1988, pp. 187-195. 
5 Cf. Hirschfeld L., On a Folk Theory of Society: Children, Evolution, and 
Mental Representations of Social Groups, «Personality and Social Psy-
chology Review», 5:2, 2001, pp. 107-117. 
6 Cf. Devine P.G., Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled 
components, «Journal of Personality and Social Psychology», 56, 1989, 
pp. 5-18. 
7 Cf. Baron-Cohen S., Leslie A.M. & Frith U., Does the autistic child have a 
“theory of mind”?, «Cognition», 21:1, 1985, pp. 37-46. 
8 Cf. Hamilton A. & Krendl A.C., Social Cognition: Overturning Stereotypes 
of and with Autism, «Current Biology», 17:16, 2007, R641-R642. 
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people’s faces9 and that children with autism perform as well as children with 
typical development in using stereotypes to predict the outcomes of new con-
texts10. If social stereotypes are merely an extension of mindreading capacity, 
autistic children should not be able to use them, facing difficulties similar to 
those of mental states attribution. A study on attribution of trustworthiness, 
attractiveness, socioeconomic status and age from bodies and faces of people 
demonstrated that individuals with Asperger Syndrome (AS) have a preserved 
ability to use stereotypes and argued in favour of Hirschfeld’s hypothesis of a 
domain of Naïve Sociology as separate from Naïve Psychology11. White et al. 
also showed that only those autistic children able to pass theory of mind tasks 
were able to judge people on the basis of their desires rather than of their 
stereotypical belonging to a social group. Hamilton and Krendl concluded that 
deficits of theory of mind do not invalidate the capacity for Naïve Sociology12. 
On the contrary, even though mindreading does not seem to be a means to 
construct social stereotypes, it could be considered as a means to soften them. 
3. Figurative language and social stereotypes in autism 
Studies dedicated to social stereotypical categorization and non-
literal language comprehension showed that social stereotypes, like 
speaker’s gender, ethnic group and occupation, are important cues 
to figurative language interpretation13. For instance, studies on the 
on-line role of gender stereotypes (operationalized by gender-
specific names) showed that this kind of social cue comes into play 
very early in the process of sarcasm comprehension and influences 
_____________ 
9 Cf. White S., Hill E., Winston J. & Frith U., An islet of social ability in As-
perger Syndrome: Judging social attributes from faces, «Brain and Cogni-
tion», 61: 1, 2006, pp. 69-77. 
10 Cf. Hirschfeld L., Bartmess E., White S. & Frith U., Can autistic children 
predict behavior by social stereotypes?, «Current Biology», 17:12, 2007, 
R451-R452. 
11 Cf. White S., Hill E., Winston J. & Frith U., An islet of social ability in As-
perger Syndrome: Judging social attributes from faces, cit. 
12 Cf. Hamilton A. & Krendl A.C., Social Cognition: Overturning Stereotypes 
of and with Autism, cit. 
13 Cf. Colston H.L. & Katz A. (eds.), Figurative Language Comprehension: 
Social and Cultural Influences, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 2005. 
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its interpretation14: sarcasm seems to be more likely to be associated 
with men rather than women15. Similar results have been found for 
ethnic16 and occupation stereotypes17. Indeed, speaker’s occupation 
has been shown to influence not only the interpretation of figura-
tive meaning in general18, but also the interpretation of ironic inten-
tion in particular19.  
Katz, Blasko and Kazmerski forcefully showed that the emer-
gence of sarcasm is produced by a character in the context expected 
to make a statement incongruent with events in the story20. Multiple 
sources of information are conjointly exploited when a listener at-
tempts to understand an ironic utterance and also social stereotype 
contributes to the facilitation effect, as the response times testify: 
 
We have now demonstrated that the information that this statement is 
made by a comedian (rather than a priest, for instance) further predisposes 
people to a sarcastic interpretation while they read it. The evidence is 
based on a convergence of reading-time data with ratings of the subjective 
sense produced by reading the text. With respect to reading time, we find 
that when the discourse context is congruent with a sarcastic interpreta-
_____________ 
14 Cf. Garnham A., Oakhill J. & Reynolds D., Are inferences from stereotyped 
role names to characters' gender made elaboratively?, «Memory & Cogni-
tion», 30, 2002, pp. 439-446; Colston H.L. & Katz A.N. (eds.), Figurative 
language comprehension: Social and cultural influences. Lawrence Erl-
baum Associates, Mahwah: NJ, 2005. 
15 Cf. Colston H.L. & Lee S.Y., Gender Differences in Verbal Irony Use, «Metaphor and 
Symbol», 19:4, 2004, pp. 289-306. 
16 Cf. Heredia R.R. & Blumentritt T.L., On-line Processing of Social Stereo-
types During Spoken Language Comprehension, «Experimental Psychol-
ogy», 49:3, 2002, pp. 208-221. 
17 Cf. Pexman P.M. & Olineck K.M., Understanding irony: How Do Stereo-
types Cue Speaker Intent?, «Journal of language and social psychology», 
21:3, 2002, pp. 245-274. 
18 Cf. Holtgraves T.M., Communication in context: The effects of speaker status on the compre-
hension of indirect requests, «Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory 
and Cognition», 20, 1994, pp. 1205-1218. 
19 Cf. Katz A.N. Lee C.J., The role of authorial intent in determining verbal irony and metaphor, 
«Metaphor and Symbolic Activity», 8, 1993, pp. 257-279.  
20 Cf. Katz A.N., Blasko D.G. & Kazmerski V.A., Saying What You Don't Mean: Social 
Influences on Sarcastic Language Processing, «Current Directions in Psychological Sci-
ence», 13, 2004, pp. 186-189. 
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tion, the target sentence is read more rapidly if it is made by a person from 
a high-irony occupation rather than a person from a low-irony occupa-
tion21.  
 
These results have been correlated with speakers’ tendencies to be 
more humorous, to mock or criticize, and to be less sincere. Irony 
could also seem a more polite and indirect way to express the 
speaker’s own thought and to comment on the failure of an expec-
tation22.  
Unfortunately, not much research has been done on the interac-
tion between social stereotypes and understanding of non-literal 
speech in autism spectrum disorders. To fill this gap in research, we 
investigated the effect of occupation stereotypes in irony under-
standing in a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or 
Asperger Syndrome (AS) and a comparison group of adults with 
typical development. High-functioning autism and Asperger Syn-
drome are widely acknowledged to be variants of autism spectrum 
disorders23, which share social and communicative impairments but 
are characterized by the absence of mental retardation. Moreover, 
differently from individuals with low-functioning autism, adults 
with HFA and AS do pass a first- and second-order false belief 
test24 and could possess a second-order theory of mind25. Anyway, 
according to other studies whenever they provide correct mental 
_____________ 
21 Katz A.N., Blasko D.G. & Kazmerski V.A., Saying What You Don't Mean: Social 
Influences on Sarcastic Language Processing, cit., p. 187. 
22 Cf. Sperber D. & Wilson D., Irony and the use–mention distinction. In P. Cole (ed.) 
Radical Pragmatics, New York: Academic Press, 1981, pp. 295-318.  
23 Cf. American Psychiatry Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (4th ed.). DSM-IV-TR (Text Revision), Washington, DC: Ameri-
can Psychiatry Association, 2000; World Health Organisation, International 
statistical classification and related health problems: Tenth revision, Geneva, 2004.  
24 Cf. Abell F., Happé F. & Frith U. (2000). Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of 
mental states to animated shapes in normal and abnormal development, «Journal of 
Cognitive Development», 15, 2000, pp. 1-20. 
25 Cf. Bowler D.M., “Theory of mind” in Asperger’s syndrome, «Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry», 33, 1992, pp. 877-893; Ozonoff S., Rogers, S. 
J. & Pennington, B.F., Asperger's syndrome evidence of an empirical distinction 
from high-functioning autism, «Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry», 
32, 1991, pp. 1107-1122. 
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state answers, they failed in giving a contextually-appropriate mental 
state answers26. According to other studies which focus on more 
fine-grained second order tasks27, individuals with HFA and AS 
show mindreading deficits in social and emotional tasks far subtler 
than previously expected. 
The study on the effect of occupation stereotypes in irony un-
derstanding in individuals with HFA and AS used a series of ver-
bally presented stories containing ironic or literal utterances pro-
duced by either a person having an occupation that is perceived as 
more prone to use sarcasm, a “sarcastic” occupation, or a person 
having a “non sarcastic” occupation. The results show that both 
groups exhibit a similar performance in recognizing ironic utter-
ances and an overall similar image of irony: ironic statements are 
generally perceived as more mocking, but also more polite and posi-
tive than literal statements. However, when a character in the story 
has an occupation stereotypically considered as sarcastic, compre-
hension of ironic utterances improved in terms of both accuracy 
and latency, only in the comparison group. These results suggest 
that individuals with high functioning autism have difficulties inte-
grating stereotypical knowledge with information about the ironic 
intention.  
Subjects with HFA and AS fail to integrate social stereotypical 
knowledge when it is implicit in the context, whereas comparison 
subjects seem to use it in a natural, unconscious and automatic way. 
So, at first sight, the present findings point to difficulties in sponta-
neous acquisition and use of stereotype knowledge. However, sev-
eral studies have underlined that the ability to acquire different types 
of social stereotypes is preserved in individuals with ASDs. Using a 
_____________ 
26 Cf. Baron-Cohen S., Jolliffe T., Mortimore C. & Robertson M., Another 
advanced test of theory of mind: evidence from very high functioning adults with autism 
or Asperger Syndrome, «Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry», 38, 
1997, pp. 813-822. 
27 Cf. Baron-Cohen S., Wheelwright S., Hill J., Raste Y. and Plumb I., The “Read-
ing the mind in the eyes” test revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults 
with Asperger Syndrome or High-Functioning autism, «Journal of Child Psychol-
ogy and Psychiatry», 42:2, 2001, pp. 241-251; Zalla T., Stopin A., Ahade S., 
Sav A-M. & Leboyer M., Faux pas detection and intentional action in Asperger Syndrome. 
A replication on a French sample, «Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders», 
39, 2009, pp. 373-382. 
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task of attribution of trustworthiness, attractiveness, socioeconomic 
status and age, White and collaborators reported a preserved ability 
to explicitly attribute social stereotypes in participants with HFA 
and AS28. Similarly, Hirschfeld et al. showed intact reasoning about 
social groups in children with autism, since they performed like 
children with typical development in using race and gender stereo-
types to predict behaviour in new contexts29. Hence, it could be 
proposed two distinct special-purpose mechanisms for processing 
social knowledge: one for information about social groups (“Naïve 
Sociology”), which is preserved in ASDs, and the other for mind-
reading (“Naïve Psychology”), which is impaired in ASDs.  
Noting that linguistic communication is the more differentiated 
kind of action in the set of intentional behaviour and that there are 
various levels of metarepresentations involved in inferential com-
prehension, Sperber & Wilson have proposed the hypothesis of a 
specialised sub-mechanism of the overall “Naïve Psychology” mod-
ule, specifically dedicated to pragmatic-inferential processes30. 
Therefore, based on previous evidence, the present findings could 
be taken to mean that difficulties in individuals with ASDs pre-
dominantly rely on failure to integrate information from this distinct 
domain-specific social sub-system. One might then speculate that 
such impairment might selectively affect pragmatic-inferential rea-
soning. In accordance with this view, failure to integrate informa-
tion from “Naïve Sociology” and “Naïve Psychology” modules 
might be restricted to pragmatic-inferential processes in people with 
ASDs.  
In conclusion, these recent findings confirm that stereotype in-
formation is automatically activated during psycholinguistic process 
involved in irony detection in typically developed people. It also 
reveals that this information is combined with pragmatic and social 
processes. In particular, stereotype knowledge exerts its influence 
on subjects’ expectancies by increasing irony detection and by af-
_____________ 
28 Cf. White S., Hill E., Winston J. & Frith U., An islet of social ability in Asperger 
Syndrome: Judging social attributes from faces, cit. 
29 Cf. Hirschfeld L., Bartmess E., White S. & Frith U., Can autistic children pre-
dict behavior by social stereotypes?, cit. 
30 Cf. Sperber D. & Wilson D., Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-reading, «Mind 
and Language», 17, 2002, pp. 3-23. 
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fecting its social traits in an implicit and automatic way. Interest-
ingly, people with HFA/AS appear to possess a preserved ability to 
understand irony and its main social functions, but they failed to 
integrate information coming from these two distinct domains of 
social knowledge. While this information automatically activates 
stereotype knowledge, these representations are not strong enough 
to enhance understanding of the speaker’s attitudinal and communi-
cative features in individuals with ASDs; it would be then available 
for pragmatic reasoning only when activated through explicit and 
voluntary processes. 
4. Intentional action and moral judgement 
The concept of intentional action plays a central role in social 
cognition. The ability to understand another person’s action from 
that person’s intentions and desires plays an important role in moral 
judgments. People normally distinguish between actions that are 
performed intentionally and those that are performed unintention-
ally and this distinction plays a crucial role in social understanding 
and moral judgment. For example, wrong intentional actions are 
judged to be worse than similar unintentional ones31 and, similarly, 
attempted but failed harmful acts are judged to be more morally 
blameworthy than accidentally ones32. 
Developmental studies have shown that children’s moral rea-
soning was positively correlated with their false-belief understand-
ing, suggesting a connection between children’s theory of mind 
(ToM, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to 
others) and moral judgment33. Indeed, moral judgments require 
them to value the actual outcomes against considerations of the 
_____________ 
31 Cf. Lagnado D.A. & Shannon S., Judgments of cause and blame: The ef-
fects of intentionality and foreseeability, «Cognition», 108, 2008, pp. 754-
770. 
32 Cf. Young L. & Saxe R, Innocent intentions: A correlation between for-
giveness for accidental harm and neural activity, «Neuropsychologia», 47, 
2009, pp. 2065-2072. 
33 Cf. Baird J.A. & Astington J.W., The role of mental state understanding in 
the development of moral cognition and moral action, «New Directions 
for Child and Adolescent Development», 103, 2004, pp. 37-49. 
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agent’s desires, beliefs and intention, which rely upon ToM reason-
ing. It has been recently argued that folk psychology and folk moral-
ity both have an impact on people’s intuitions about how to apply 
the concept of intentional action34. While people usually believed 
that whether an action is performed intentionally or unintentionally 
influences our moral judgment of that action, there are circum-
stances in which an action is more likely to be thought of as inten-
tional when that action is morally bad than when it is morally good. 
In other words, the application of the folk concept of “intentional 
action” does not simply reflect beliefs about the agent’s psychologi-
cal states, but is vice versa affected by the moral valence of the 
agent’s behaviour.  
In individuals with typical development, moral cognition has 
been primarily studied by assessing the ability to distinguish moral 
from conventional transgressions. Cross cultural studies have 
shown that children with typical development distinguish between 
these two types of transgression along a number of dimensions35. 
Moral transgressions are usually considered to be more serious, less 
permissible and less authority-dependent than conventional ones. 
Furthermore, the explanation of why moral transgressions are 
wrong tend to refer to fairness and harm to victims, while in the 
case of conventional transgressions tend to refer to the violation of 
social rules. The distinction between moral and conventional rules 
also reflects differences in the participants’ affective responses: 
transgressions of conventional rules rarely cause distress to persons, 
while moral transgressions are likely to produce a negative emo-
tional impact36.  
_____________ 
34 Cf. Knobe J., Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language, 
«Analysis», 63, 2003, pp. 190-193; Knobe J., Intentional action in folk 
psychology: An experimental investigation, «Philosophical Psychology», 
16, 2003, pp. 309-324; Knobe J., Intention, intentional action and moral 
considerations, «Analysis», 64, 2004, pp. 181-187. 
35 For reviews, see Nucci L., Education in the moral domain, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001; Smetana J. (1993). Understanding of social rules. In M. 
Bennett (ed.), The development of social cognition: The child as psychologist, New York: 
Guilford Press, pp. 111-141. 
36 Cf. Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Research on moral cognition in subjects with typical develop-
ment has focused on two perspectives: the first perspective claims 
that moral judgment is the product of conscious reasoning on the 
basis of explicit abstract principles37; the second one relies on the 
assumption that moral judgment is the product of intuitive, auto-
matic, and unconscious affective responses38. This second perspec-
tive particularly focused attention on the role of empathy, which can 
be considered as a complex process, made up of two relatively in-
dependent components: an affective, phylogenetically early, emo-
tional contagion system and a more advanced, cognitive perspec-
tive-taking system39. While affective empathy refers to the capacity 
to experience emotional reactions to the observed experiences of 
others by automatically activating one’s own representations for the 
related emotional states, the cognitive notion of empathy refers to 
the ability to engage in the effortful conscious cognitive process of 
adopting another’s psychological point of view and infer their men-
tal states40. In other terms, cognitive empathy involves processes 
such as perspective-taking and ToM41.  
With respect to empathy dysfunction, the inability to share emo-
tional states with others has been described as one of the most strik-
_____________ 
37 Cf. Piaget J., The moral judgment of the child, New York: Free Press, 1965/1932; Kohl-
berg L., Essays on moral development: The philosophy of moral development (Vol. 1). New 
York: Harper Row, 1981. 
38 Cf. Haidt J., The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to 
moral judgment, «Psychological Review», 108, 2001, pp. 814-834. 
39 Cf. De Waal, F. B. (2008). Putting the altruism back into altruism: The evolution of 
empathy, «Annual Review of Psychology», 59, pp. 279-300. 
40 Cf. Davis, M. H., Empathy: A social psychological approach. Madison, WI: Brown 
& Benchmark, 1994; Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in 
empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. «Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology», 44, 113–126. 
41 Cf. Blair, R. J. R. Responding to the emotions of others: Dissociating forms of empathy 
through the study of typical and psychiatric populations, «Consciousness and Cog-
nition», 14, 2005, pp. 698-718; Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Aharon-Peretz, J., 
& Perry, D., Two systems for empathy: A double dissociation between emotional and 
cognitive empathy in inferior frontal gyrus versus ventromedial prefrontal lesions. 
«Brain», 132, 2009, pp. 617–627; Singer, T. The neuronal basis and ontogeny of 
empathy and mind reading, review of literature and implications for future research. 
«Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews», 30, 2006, pp. 855–863. 
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ing clinical features of individuals with ASDs42. Baron-Cohen and 
collaborators have shown that difficulties in understanding others’ 
affective states arise in people with ASDs when the appreciation of 
the emotion requires the representation of others’ beliefs, such as 
surprise or embarrassment, but not for emotions generated by fac-
tual events43. As reported in the previous sections, impairments in 
mentalization are indeed thought to be the core features of autism. 
However, while an extensive literature has assessed ToM abilities in 
individuals with ASDs, relatively few studies have explored their 
competence in moral reasoning and the interconnection between 
affective and cognitive empathy. A study reported that young par-
ticipants with ASDs showed difficulties distinguishing the unin-
tended from the intended outcomes of their own actions as com-
pared to a comparison group, when the unintended actions were 
positively valued. Compared with children with similar intellectual 
abilities, young children with ASDs tended to find it difficult to 
understand that desirable outcomes might be unintended44. 
Conversely, some moral competencies in individuals with ASDs 
are relatively preserved. Grant and collaborators showed that chil-
dren with high functioning autism can distinguish between damage 
to property and to persons, between social-conventional and moral 
rules, and judged damage to persons as more severe than damage to 
property although their justifications had fewer references to the 
_____________ 
42 Cf. Kanner L., Autistic disturbances of affective contact, «Nervous Child», 2, 1943, 
pp. 217-250. 
43 Cf. Baron-Cohen, S. Do people with autism understand what causes emotion? «Child 
Development», 62, 1991, pp. 385–395; Baron-Cohen, S., Spitz, A., & 
Cross, P. Can children with autism recognize surprise? «Cognition and Emo-
tion», 7, 1993, pp. 507–551. However, Castelli showed that children with 
autism were as able as controls to recognize the six basic emotions from 
facial expressions (anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise). The 
author suggested that individuals with autism might use compensatory 
strategies to bypass their deficit in emotion recognition. (Cf. Castelli, F. 
(2005). Understanding emotions from standardized facial expressions in autism and 
normal development. «Autism», 9:4, 2005, pp. 428–449). 
44 Cf. Phillips, W., Baron-Cohen, S., & Rutter, M. Understanding intention in normal devel-
opment and in autism. «British Journal of Developmental Psychology», 16, 1998, pp. 
337–348. 
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agent’s intention45. Similarly, Blair showed that in spite of their im-
pairments in ToM, children with ASDs are able to draw the distinc-
tion between moral and conventional transgressions46. Recently, 
Leslie and collaborators concluded that basic moral judgment is 
preserved in autism and that it may function somewhat independ-
ently of ToM47. 
5. Moral normativity in autism 
Using an advanced ToM test, the Faux Pas recognition task48, 
Zalla and collaborators showed that individuals with HFA and AS 
have difficulty distinguishing intentional from non-intentional be-
haviours49. A faux pas is a particular case of a non -intentional ac-
tion, since it occurs when a speaker says something that might hurt 
or be unpleasant to the listener, although the speaker never in-
tended it to do so. Interestingly, they over-attributed intentions to 
the agents unintentionally committing a blunder (e.g. the faux pas) 
and frequently provided explanations in terms of malevolence. For 
example, they judged that the speaker committing the faux pas in-
tended to humiliate and to offend the listener. In some cases, nega-
tive judgments about the character were presented in terms of per-
sonality traits. These findings revealed that while individuals with 
HFA and AS were able to detect social rule violations and to pro-
_____________ 
45 Cf. Grant, C. M., Boucher, J., Riggs, K. J., & Grayson, A. Moral understanding in 
children with autism. «Autism», 9, 2005, pp. 317–331. 
46 Cf. Blair, R. J. R.. Brief report: Morality in the autistic child. Journal of Autism and De-
velopmental Disorders, 26, 1996, pp. 571–579. 
47 Cf. Leslie, A. M., Mallon, R., & Dicorcia, J. A. Transgressors, victims, and cry 
babies: Is basic moral judgment spared in autism? «Social Neuroscience», 1, 
2006, pp. 270–283. 
48 Cf. Baron-Cohen, S., O’Riordan, M., Stone V., Jones R., & Plaisted K., 
Recognition of faux pas by normally developing children and children with Asperger 
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Disorders», 29:5, 1999, pp. 407–418. 
49 Cf. Zalla, T., Stopin, A., Ahade, S., Sav, A.-M., & Leboyer, M. Faux Pas 
detection and intentional action in Asperger syndrome. A replication on a French 
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vide moral judgments about the story events by blaming the speaker 
for committing an offensive intentional act, both their abilities to 
interpret an action outcome as intentional or accidental and to pro-
vide an empathic appreciation of the listener‘s emotional state were 
diminished. 
Their ability to understand whether an action is intentional or 
unintentional might be compromised because of their difficulties 
with ToM reasoning. In the absence of full-fledged ToM compe-
tence, HFA and AS subjects’ judgments of intentionality can differ 
from those expressed by participants with typical development. 
Interestingly, in accordance with Zalla & Leboyer results, individu-
als with AS did appeal to psychological states in reasoning about 
social situations, even if they made inappropriate judgments of in-
tention in judging that the character in the story intended to hurt 
the addressee50. By using two pairs of vignettes, the Knobe’s 
Harm/Help cases and Murder/Bull’s-eye cases51, Zalla & Leboyer 
showed that, as already observed in typical population, in individu-
als with HFA and AS judgment of intentional action is informed by 
the moral appreciation of the action outcome. However, the two 
groups differed on praise judgments and moral justifications, sug-
gesting that these processes were poorly influenced by the agent’s 
psychological states. They concluded that, although under certain 
circumstances, individuals with HFA and AS and people with typi-
cal development have similar intuitive judgments of intentionality. 
Over-assignment of praise judgments and the reduced use of folk-
psychological concepts in moral judgment would reflect difficulties 
using intentionality information for moral reasoning. 
Previous studies have suggested that individuals of higher verbal 
ability, and in particular those with Asperger Syndrome, who can 
pass False Belief tasks, employ linguistic strategies to circumvent 
ToM impairments52. In the same vein, one can speculate that the 
_____________ 
50 Cf. Zalla, T., & Leboyer, M. Judgment of intentionality and moral evaluation in 
individuals with high functioning autism. «Review of Philosophy and Psychol-
ogy», 121, 2011, pp. 115-126. 
51 Cf. Knobe, J. Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language, cit.; Knobe, J. 
Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation, cit. 
52 Cf. Happé, F. An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story characters’ 
thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped and normal children and 
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attribution of intentional agency in people with HFA and AS might 
come from compensation mechanisms involving their spared moral 
intuition to normative reasoning, often associated with a strong 
sensitivity to normative violations. Although it has been proposed 
that ToM and moral reasoning develop independently and rely on 
distinct neurocognitive systems53, other studies have shown that the 
two domains actually interact at both the cognitive and neural levels. 
It would then be interesting to assess whether impairments in ToM, 
as measured by more advanced ToM test (as for instance the Faux 
Pas recognition test), would affect the ability of individuals with 
HFA and AS to draw the distinction among different types of nor-
mative transgressions.  
In 2011, Zalla and collaborators54 tested the ability of adults with 
HFA and AS to distinguish moral, conventional, and disgust trans-
gressions using the task developed by Nichols55. Participants were 
given a set of transgressions scenarios followed by questions about 
permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency, and justification. 
Their aim was to assess whether ToM impairments of individuals 
with HFA and AS affect their abilities to provide distinctive judg-
ments for these kinds of transgressions and appropriate normative 
justifications. According to Nichols, in subjects with typical devel-
opment, moral, conventional and disgust transgressions are judged 
wrong because they are prohibited by a set of internally represented 
norms. He also argued that moral and disgust norms differ from 
conventional ones in that the former are backed by affective and 
emotional reactions.  
_____________ 
adults. «Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders», 24, 1995, pp. 
129–154; Tager-Flusberg, H., & R.M. Joseph. Identifying neurocognitive pheno-
types in autism. «Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society», 358, 
2003, pp. 303–314. 
53 Cf. Blair, R. J. R. Responding to the emotions of others: Dissociating forms 
of empathy through the study of typical and psychiatric populations, cit. 
54 Cf. Zalla, T., Barlassina, L., Buon, M., & Leboyer M., Moral judgment in 
adults with autism spectrum disorders. «Cognition», 121, 2011, pp. 115–
126. 
55 Cf. Nichols, S. Norms with feeling: Toward a psychological account of 
moral judgment. «Cognition», 84, 2002, pp. 223–236; Nichols, S. Senti-
mental rules: On the natural foundations of moral judgment. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
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Zalla and collaborators confirmed previous evidence showing 
that participants with typical development are able to distinguish 
affect-backed norm transgressions from conventional affect-neutral 
norm transgressions and to provide different justifications for the 
three types of normative violations. Their findings also showed that 
adults with HFA/AS judged conventional and disgust transgres-
sions to be significantly more serious than did the comparison 
group, and failed to distinguish disgust transgressions from moral 
transgressions along the seriousness dimension. Moreover, for both 
moral and conventional transgressions, they favoured explanations 
in terms of ‘‘Rules’’ rather than in terms of “Others’ Welfare” and 
failed in drawing the moral/conventional distinction along the di-
mension of justification. However, like the comparison group, they 
were able to detect transgressions and to judge that moral and dis-
gust transgressions were less permissible and less authority-
dependent than conventional transgressions. 
The authors pointed out three main considerations that emerged 
from these findings56: 1) adults with HFA and AS have learnt a 
normative theory that enables them to reason according to norma-
tive rules when asked to apply this knowledge to real-life situations; 
2) they were able to distinguish affect-backed from conventional 
affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seri-
ousness and authority-dependence (which could suggest that they 
are able to use affective responsiveness to make distinctive judg-
ments) and, within the category of affect-backed norms, moral 
transgressions were judged as less authority contingent than disgust 
ones; 3) they provided justifications in terms of “Rules” rather than 
in terms of “Others’ Welfare” revealing that emotion information is 
not used for conscious processes of moral reasoning. They con-
cluded that the fact that individuals with HFA/AS are able to dis-
tinguish non conventional from conventional prohibitions might 
suggest that emotional appraisal is relatively preserved, while diffi-
culties to distinguish moral and conventional violations patently 
arise when they are asked to provide explicit and conscious justifica-
tions for their judgments. 
_____________ 
56 Cf. Zalla, T., Barlassina, L., Buon, M., & Leboyer M., Moral judgment in adults 
with autism spectrum disorders, cit. 
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6. Conclusion 
Zalla and collaborators study reveals that difficulties providing 
appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of 
transgressions at a fine-grained level in individuals with ASDs may 
be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while 
responsive to rule violations, fails to integrate and use relevant in-
formation about the agent’s intentions and affective states in con-
scious moral reasoning. At the same times, recent findings, dis-
cussed in the first and the second sections, showed that people with 
HFA and AS appear to possess a preserved ability to understand 
irony and its main social functions, but they failed to integrate in-
formation coming from these two distinct domains of social knowl-
edge. In both cases, it is likely that, although people with ASDs pos-
sess spared social and moral intuition to normative reasoning, as 
reported by previous studies, the use of this information would oc-
cur only when overtly available through controlled and effortful 
mechanisms. Thus, a compensatory cognitive strategy based on this 
spared social and moral ability to make reliable predictions about 
others’ behaviour would likely rely on effortful and controlled 
mechanisms acting on explicit social and moral norms in individuals 
with ASDs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
